Power shifts and War

This Wednesday, we discussed the effect of the distribution of power on uncertainty and the propensity for war in the international system. Just recently, the journal International Organization published an article about this exact topic with an application to the 2003 Iraq War. We'll talk more about this case later, but you may want to check out this article when you get a chance. Some key parts:

Large and rapid power shifts resulting from exogenous economic growth are considered sufficient to cause preventive wars.
...
Large and rapid power shifts are deterred through the threat of a preventive war. When investments remain undetected, however, states may be tempted to introduce power shifts as a fait accompli. Knowing this, their adversaries may strike preventively even without conclusive evidence of militarization. In fact, the more effective preventive wars are, the more likely they will be launched against states that are not militarizing. Our argument emphasizes the role of imperfect information as a cause of war. It also explains why powerful states may attack weaker targets even with ambiguous evidence of their militarization. 

You can find the article here (not gated if accessed from the campus network).