Friday, November 22, 2013

The Fragmenting of Al Qaeda

In an article published this week by Foreign Affairs, William McCants discusses the mismanagement of Al Qaeda by its senior leaders. This topic comes in relation to our discussion this week on military organizations, professionalism, and their ties to government. Any organization as large as the Al Qaeda network needs to follow certain rules and regulations to keep from tearing itself apart. The organizations current leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri is now being reported as having significant problems keeping this kind of infighting out of the organization. Of the four major affiliates, the two in Northern and Western Africa have not been seeing eye to eye as of late. This is a result of having an influx in activity from Al Qaeda and an increase in their recruitment opportunities in the region. Interestingly, what is happening is when these affiliates attempt to recruit from the same regions, they end up squabbling over who will be in charge of the operations. Additionally, the Al Qaeda in Iraq affiliate or AQI has been openly defying Al Qaeda leadership during its operations in Syria. This groups leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi has stated his organization has been operating within the Al Nusra front for an extended period of time and claims he has command over the Al Nusra organization. However, leadership from Al Nusra has rejected this claim, instead pledging allegiance to Zawahiri directly. These kinds of disconnects within an organization represent the chaos that can be created when expansion happens too quickly. Now Zawahiri is attempting to reunited his fragmented affiliates into a working global network.

These concepts apply well to our class by comparing them to the structure and management of the US Army. Although this organization is similar in scale, the US Army is significantly more professional and well managed. This is because of the various rules and regulations each soldier in the Army is held accountable to at all times. There are laws within the organization as well that dictate what a soldier may or may not do, and prevent the types of fragmentation that Al Qaeda has seen. Additionally, our military is tied in to our federal government and takes its missions from our commander in chief, President Obama.

What else do you all feel contributes to the success of large organizations like the military? Additionally, what other factors may be contributing to the fragmentation of Al Qaeda and other similar groups?

Sources:Foreign AffairsAl ShofraCNN

9 comments:

  1. I believe that the civilian support that the U.S. military has contributes to the professionalism, that Al Qaeda does not have. Salary and benefits are also a huge part at maintaing this relationship, that I am sure far exceed what members of Al Qaeda are receiving. Fundamentally it is how the leaders treat and take care of U.S. military members and organizations like Al Qaeda could be lacking and contributing to the fragmentation of this group.

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  2. Comparing Al Qaeda and the U.S. military is kind of difficult given the intrinsically different natures of the two. However, in response to your question I think agree with Tanner that the support of the U.S. populate as well as the government contributes to the legitimacy and professionalism of the American military. Al Qaeda is an organization founded with religious ideology that transcends national borders, and this scope of an organization is obviously much more difficult to control and organize. Furthermore, following the war on terror much of the leadership of Al Qaeda has been fragmented and that has resulted in a lack of central control that has weakened the foundation of the organization.

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  3. One issue in comparing the two is that the US military is the agent of a government that represents the populace. Al Queda is not accountable to anyone. They have a disconnect in their purpose and vision and lack the organizational structure to support any sort of internal accountability. The fighting is perpetuated further by the fact that their is not a strong hierarchy of power. Men of relatively similar power and office are struggling for positional power.

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  4. Using the United States military as a case study, the organizational success of them stems from the elected power position from the Commander in Chief. The salary and benefits of the US Armed Forces ensures legitimacy and professionalism. Additionally, I would argue that the affirmation and pride the American people (in general) have in the USAF leads them to act legitimately and rationally.
    In a dissimilar fashion, the Al-Qaeda have no centralized organization of power, no salary, and certainly do not hold themselves accountable to legitimatization by the polity. They can benefit from this by having the freedom to make quick decisions. Professionalism could still play a role in their duties if they want to gain intergroup respect. Overall, I feel this argument is comparing apples to oranges, but the USAF is held accountable to a higher power whereas the Al-Qaeda is not, leading to the legitimacy of the former and the fragmentation of the latter.

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  5. Going off of Seth's comment, particularly when you have a group like Al Qaeda that is so decentralized it's important to remember that with such groups there is never really such thing as guaranteed total victory. Even if the U.S. military continues to be aggressive in hunting down Al Qaeda's leaders globally the group itself, or ideological spinoff groups will continue to exist in the world. Thinking in particular or the steadily fragmenting nature of the group it's important to realize that while but breaking up the group we are putting the fire out, we might just be spreading embers all over the place at the same time, ready to sit and roast until they too become fires of their own. AS to what contributes to our millitarys success, i'm not sure that per capita we really are that successful, as bloated as our defense budget is.

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  6. Very interesting post. I agree with Tanner, in that it is very difficult to compare US and Al Qaeda. However, i strongly believe that incentives such as high salary are he best at keeping military, or in this case Al Qaeda, more united and under control.

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  7. Very interesting post. I agree with Tanner, in that it is very difficult to compare US and Al Qaeda. However, i strongly believe that incentives such as high salary are he best at keeping military, or in this case Al Qaeda, more united and under control.

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  8. I'm sure that an organization like Al Qaeda is extremely difficult to organize since they are recruiting from mostly poor and uneducated areas. A large part of the US military is extensive training and education for the higher ranks so that people within the ranks can understand the military order. Also, the religious ideology that goes into a group like Al Qaeda would make it hard to keep everyone satisfied with the objectives of the group since beliefs would range substantially from area to area. The lack of a specific religious ideology within the US military likely makes it easier to keep a type of professionalism.

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  9. I would draw a lot of parallels to the initial PRC's army before seizing power over China, directly after, and then as the Mao years end and reform begins to occur. Like Al Qaeda the "Red" Army had an initial and pretty basic cause to get masses around. Unlike Al Qaeda, this may be because their cause was greater, or they had a better public relations scheme. But the communist party and it's military wing were able to gain a enough support from the masses. Gained from the portrayal of them fighting the Japanese incursion. However the point is they both had a basic message without a strict chain of commands. Militarily that is, politically they were better organized. Which lead to them being able to mobilize mass amounts of people, however they weren't always the best organized.
    The Korean War would be evidence of that, although China considered it a (moral) victory. They were able to stand up to one of the most powerful militaries known, but at great cost. There would be factional infighting as to how to organize the army. Ranks were set up, and Mao's Red Book was distributed. Now every solider new exactly what they were fighting for, and who was in charge.
    When Mao died they were able to better organize and reform.
    Alright my longwinded point is Al Qaeda like the Red Arm before it became the PLA had a simple message. Unlike the PLA there is not one definite leader or structure calling the shots. Terrorism as stated in class is cheaper, but when you don't have the right tools you have to improvise. To recruit you have to have something to say and it appears what each group is saying has a conflicting view. I wouldn't be surprised to see many factions shift many of their actions due to motivations of greed rather than grievance or cause.

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