Monday, November 18, 2013
The Futility of Nuclear Compellence
The recent negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran have demonstrated the overall ineffectuality
of nuclear weapons concerning matters of compellence. In, “Crisis Bargaining
and Nuclear Blackmail”, Sechser and Fuhrmann discovered that the presence of
nuclear superiority and an ability to decimate an enemy through nuclear war
does not convey the ability to coerce. We are seeing this finding play out in
the negotiations with Iran. Despite the overwhelming nuclear capabilities of
the P5+1, Iran apparently does not fear any nuclear attack on their soil.
Rather, we are seeing the Iranians approach the negotiating table due to the vast
sanctions imposed as an act of compellence.
Although
the causes of nuclear non-use are unclear, whether a nuclear taboo truly exists
or if non-use is determined by utility, economic sanctions are influencing
international relations where nuclear weapons have failed. In fact, Iran’s
agreement to negotiations appears to be a direct result of a mandate by the supreme
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to relieve the sanctions (Negotiating With Iran). The fact that economic sanctions have succeeded where the immense power of nuclear weapons have failed is not lost on the P5+1 or Iran. If nuclear compellence truly worked, it is likely we would have seen it employed by the United States in the form of coercive military action or threats. Rather than try to stave off a military attack, it seems that Iran has approached the table in order to relieve these effective sanctions.
Furthermore, if not for a defection by France, it appears that the negotiations would have led to a significant deal between the P5+1 and Iran. This deal would have constrained Iran's ability to continue producing weapons-grade nuclear power in exchange for relief of some sanctions damaging the Iranian economy (Not There Yet). Perhaps at this stage of history concerning nuclear-influenced bargaining it should be surprising that these immensely powerful weapons are proving ineffective in determining the course of negotiations. Iran doesn't seem to fear a US nuclear attack, which would be a coercive tool to halt the Iranian nuclear program.
If the target goal of these negotiations is a reduction of Iranian nuclear activities in order to prevent military action, than Israel seems to be party most interested in making sure this route isn't pursued (Netanyahu Increases Pressure). Israel seems content relying on policy that is militarily-based and discredits the effectiveness of economic sanctions. They would prefer to pursue compellence based on military threats or actions. However, through past actions, we can see that this line of reason isn't the most effective form of compellence. Economic sanctions, not military threats, have pushed Iran to the negotiating table. To retreat to a policy of veiled military aggression would seemingly be a misstep. Unless the United States was prepared to pursue military action not supported by the international community (which they don't appear to be), then negotiations with Iran must continue.
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I think that it is important to note that Iran has been deterred from their nuclear program through sanctions and not threat of nuclear attack. I think that Iran's stance is heavily reliant on the international norm that is against first strike with nuclear weapons. They know that the United States or any other P5 country would most likely not strike first with nuclear weapons because of the repercussions from the international community for indiscriminate killing. Iran is a prime example of how sanctions are a non-violent way to get what you want effectively, for the most part. It also plays at the fact that nuclear capability does not necessarily help your bargaining power. It is more of your economic position that helps your bargaining power.
ReplyDeleteAlthough I agree that the economic sanctions against Iran have been crucial to the international community getting Iran to come to the bargaining table, I disagree about your assumption that Israel's militarily-based goal of compellence has been ineffective. Compellence is "a set of decisions, policies and actions intended to force an opponent to take some action, as opposed to deterring the adversary not to take a different action" (Citizendium). One could argue that Israel's ability to project it's military power over Iran is part of the reason Iran has not taken even more drastic measures to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has been under intense scrutinization by the Israeli military and as such, it has made the operation to develop nuclear weapons in Iran much more difficult. If Iran is still developing nuclear weapons, it has had to do so through clandestine, roundabout ways in order to try and mask them from the vigilant Israel. I think that by having a direct influence in the Middle East (Israel), the P5 +1 has more bargaining power than if they lacked a legitimate military force in the region.
ReplyDeleteAdditionally, while economic sanctions are largely successful in signaling a nation's intent, what could be more of a signal than military action to show Israel's intent, and commitment to stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons?
I do not think nuclear weapons hold much, if any weight in deterring Iran from building their own nuclear weapons arsenal. Economic sanctions imposed upon Iran have been effective in coercion to begin the process of nuclear weapons relinquishment. Iran understands, in accordance with the Sechser and Fuhrmann article, it is not coercion through the use of nuclear weapons. I would add, it is deterrence. In this situation, the United States are not trying to deter Iran from dropping nuclear weapons, rather are trying to coerce them from continuing the production of the nuclear technology. Therefore, a sanction is the least costly, most effective option for the United States to employ. They will hopefully coerce Iran to act in accordance with our proposals, whereas the use of nuclear weapons would be simply taboo and unnecessary.
ReplyDeleteThe developments in Iran of late have been extremely interesting and moved surprisingly smoothly. Unfortunately there has been a break down in these developments but there are still hopes that a deal can be struck. One interesting new factor that has been largely overlooked is the reported cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia in order to curb the development of Iran's nuclear capability. This is interesting due to the fact that Israel and Saudi are traditional enemies but have come together under the banner of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Although Saudi Arabia denies this connection, it would be strategically desirable, particularly for the US, who would have two regional powers placing additional pressure on Iran's regime. It will be interesting to see how these added factors will play into the negotiation process.
ReplyDeleteLink to the Al-Jazeera article: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/saudi-denies-contact-with-israel-iran-20131118151037669681.html
While nuclear weapons may not be able to compel actions of other countries in the hands of a country that obeys a set of international norms about non-use, what about a country like Iran that may not see these norms as important? This may be why the west is so concerned about Iran's nuclear program. Why else would they want to create nuclear weapons if they are not fearful of an attack by any other nuclear power? They are clearly not trying to get them for deterrent purposes, so it is possible that they want want nuclear weapons to coerce other countries around them to act in a way more favorable to Iran.
ReplyDeleteNuclear weapons since WWII have no longer used in the way to compel. MAD has been a known theory since the USSR gained nuclear capability. The world would be safer without nukes. Yet the technology exist and therefore I believe, at least for some countries, that nuclear capability must be maintained. However and I could be wrong but I think a lot of similarities to China can be made for Iran's current predicament. The country wants to be independent and to become heard or a player in international politics. They tend seem extreme to other countries and have good reason for being hostile and mistrusting of foreign intentions. Making negotiations difficult and at times counter productive. I think like most things repetition of willingness and good intentions will increase relations. However that being said the United States and other countries need to stand strong on anti-expansion of nuclear arms while offering incentives to disarm or stop nuclear development.
ReplyDelete